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Abstract: We study the relation between audit committee accounting expertise, analyst following, 
and market liquidity. Our main results indicate that analyst following increases subsequent to the 
appointment of an accounting expert to the audit committee. We also provide evidence that accrual 
quality, as opposed to audit quality or management earnings forecasts, is the channel through 
which accounting expertise increases analyst following and improves analyst forecast properties. 
We also show that audit committee accounting expertise is related to higher trading volume and 
lower liquidity risk, supporting incentives for greater analyst following. Our study extends prior 
literature by providing evidence that audit committee accounting expertise enhances firms’ 
information environment beyond the effects it has on financial reporting quality or analysts’ 
forecast properties. Our study also complements the literature on determinants of analyst following 
and market liquidity, both of which are related to cost of capital. Results from our study should be 
useful to firms seeking to enhance analyst following and market liquidity.  
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In this study, we examine the relation between accounting expertise on the audit committee 
and analyst following. Boards of directors improve their performance by delegating authority to 
standing committees, such as the audit committee, that specialize in narrowly defined functions 
(Klein 1998). We study accounting expertise as a primary feature of audit committee composition 
that prior research finds is related to enhanced financial reporting (Carcello et al. 2008; Krishnan 
and Visvanathan 2008; Dhaliwal et al. 2010). We extend prior research by providing a more 
complete understanding of the effect of audit committee accounting expertise on firms’ broader 
information environment beyond financial reporting, as proxied by analyst following and market 
liquidity. Understanding the relation between audit committee accounting expertise, analyst 
following, and market liquidity has important implications for firms seeking greater analyst 
coverage and lower cost of capital, as well as for regulators concerned with audit committee 
effectiveness.  
Prior research finds that audit committee accounting expertise is associated with greater 
forecast accuracy and reduced forecast dispersion (Abernathy et al. 2013).1 However, it does not 
necessarily follow that accounting expertise will also lead to increased analyst following. While 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) show that firms with more informative disclosures have greater analyst 
following and better forecast properties, Lehavey et al. (2011), in contrast, show that firms with 
more complex disclosures have greater analyst following but worse forecast properties. As Lang 
et al. (2003) argue, analyst forecast accuracy could operate independently from analyst following 
                                                            
 
1 In contrast, Byard, et al. (2006) do not find a significant relation between audit committee independence and 
analyst forecast accuracy. 
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because of information gathering by other capital market intermediaries (e.g., buy-side analysts) 
and/or because firms disclose more information. It is therefore an open empirical question as to 
whether audit committee accounting expertise impacts analyst following.  
Theoretically, Bushman et al. (2004, p. 210) argue that governance mechanisms and analysts 
are “interrelated information mechanisms,” suggesting that analysts likely respond to audit 
committee composition. Consistent with theory, professional practice standards require analysts 
to incorporate information from governance disclosures in their decision making (CFA Institute 
2005). Prior research demonstrates that analyst following increases with higher Standard & Poor’s 
rankings of board structure disclosures (Yu 2009). In addition, surveys report that both buy-side 
and sell-side analysts consider weak corporate governance as one of the two highest indicators of 
intentional misreporting and over 75 percent of sell-side analysts report that corporate governance 
is a factor in their decision to cover a company (Brown et al. 2014; Brown et al. 2015).  
We hypothesize that analyst following increases after the appointment of accounting experts 
to the audit committee. Because analysts monitor management (Jung et al. 2012), enhanced 
monitoring by audit committee accounting experts may reduce analysts’ costs to follow a firm, 
leading to a complementary relation between analysts and audit committee accounting expertise. 
For example, prior survey research finds analysts report higher confidence in financial reporting 
quality when an accounting expert is on the audit committee compared to other types of expertise 
(Dickins et al. 2009). In the spirit of Lang and Lundholm (1996), we also expect analysts to be 
attracted to firms with audit committee accounting expertise because these firms have higher 
financial reporting quality than firms with other types of audit committee expertise (Carcello et al. 
2008). However, we may not find results consistent with our hypothesis if improved financial 
reporting associated with audit committee accounting expertise reduces analysts’ competitive 
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advantage, leading to decreased analyst coverage (Lehavy et al. 2011). Providing further support 
for analysts’ incentives to follow the firm, we also expect greater market liquidity for firms with 
audit committee accounting expertise because of an improved information environment (Healy et 
al. 1999).   
We execute our tests with a random sample of 460 firms over the period 1998 to 2003. This 
time period provides a powerful setting for our study because firms were likely to change their 
audit committee composition to include, for the first time, members with accounting expertise due 
to the influence of both the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) and the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX). 
For our main test, we construct panel data for the 131 sample firms that appointed an accounting 
expert to the audit committee during our sample period and use a time series approach to address 
potential endogeneity issues (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Healy et al. 1999). Because the 
dependent variable (i.e., analyst coverage) is a non-negative integer, we use a Poisson model to 
estimate our main regression.  
We find that analyst following increases after the appointment of an accounting expert to the 
audit committee, even after controlling for other governance strength, institutional investors, the 
number of analysts employed by the brokerage firm, analyst effort, firm size, growth, profitability, 
trading volume, security offerings, return volatility, intangibles, year fixed effects, and firm fixed 
effects. Our results are robust to using alternative analysis periods, a pooled cross-sectional model, 
non-accounting expertise, across the pre- and post-Reg FD periods, an alternative measure of 
governance strength, and across the pre- and post-SOX periods. Our results are also robust to using 
a Negative Binomial model and a Tobit model to control for the count data nature of analyst 
following (Rock et al. 2001). 
 4 
 
To provide deeper insights into our main result, we test three potential channels through which 
accounting expertise could impact analyst following: (i) audit quality, (ii) management earnings 
forecasts, and (iii) accrual quality. Results indicate that accounting expertise increases analyst 
following only through the channel of enhanced accrual quality. That is, we find that the impact 
of the appointment of an accounting expert on analyst following is significantly greater when 
accrual quality is higher, but no effect from audit quality or management earnings forecasts. In 
additional tests, we first replicate results from Abernathy et al. (2013), who find that analyst 
forecast errors and dispersion are lower following the appointment of accounting experts to the 
audit committee. Extending Abernathy et al. (2013), we find that accounting expertise on the audit 
committee has a significant economic impact on forecast properties through the accrual quality 
channel, but not through audit quality or management earnings forecasts.  
Despite our efforts to control for known factors related to analysts’ decisions and our use of 
firm fixed effects, results in Brown et al. (2015) suggest that analysts’ incentives to follow firms 
are not clear. We therefore provide evidence about whether accounting expertise generates positive 
capital market effects. To do so, we assess the relation between accounting expertise and both 
trading volume and liquidity risk (Liu 2006), factors related to cost of capital. The intuition is that 
audit committee accounting expertise increases firms’ information environment, leading to 
increased investor interest in firms’ stocks. We report a positive (negative) relation between 
trading volume (liquidity risk) and accounting expertise, suggesting that accounting expertise 
provides significant capital market benefits beyond enhanced financial reporting, increased analyst 
following and enhanced analyst forecast properties. These results also support analyst incentives 
to follow a firm (Healy et al. 1999). 
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Our study makes several important contributions to the literature. First, given that analysts are 
an important aspect of a firm’s information environment (Bushman et al. 2004), our findings are 
consistent with audit committee accounting expertise having a profound impact on firms’ 
information environment, beyond that provided by its impact on single dimensions of financial 
reporting, such as accrual quality. Furthermore, our results suggest that accounting experts enhance 
analyst following through their monitoring of accruals. Because analysts proxy for sophisticated 
investors and influence investors (Schipper 1991; Mikhail et al. 2007), our evidence also suggests 
that audit committee accounting expertise helps to enhance investor confidence in financial 
reporting. Since firms realize significant benefits from analyst following,2 evidence of a positive 
relation between analyst following and audit committee accounting expertise should be useful to 
firms seeking to enhance analyst coverage.  
Second, we extend Abernathy et al. (2013). While Abernathy et al. (2013) attempt to assess 
whether accruals are the channel through which accounting expertise impacts forecast accuracy 
and dispersion, they perform an indirect test by including accrual quality as a control variable and 
find that it has a weak economic impact on results. In contrast, we perform a direct test by including 
the interactive effect of accounting expertise and accruals quality on analyst forecast properties 
and find much stronger economic significance than in Abernathy et al. (2013). Moreover, we test 
two other channels, audit quality and management earnings forecasts, and do not find an interactive 
                                                            
 
2 Through their coverage of a firm, analysts increase a firm’s visibility among investors (Womack 1996), increase 
liquidity (Roulstone 2003), and reduce both the cost of equity (Gebhardt et al. 2001; Gode and Mohanram 2003; 
Easley and O’Hara 2004) and the cost of debt (Cheng and Subramanyam 2008). Our study offers a compelling reason 
for firms to consider accounting expertise when appointing members to the audit committee, even for firms that 
already have high quality financial reporting. As Easley and O’Hara (2004) note, companies benefit from increased 
analyst coverage because it leads to less information asymmetry and a corresponding decline in cost of capital. 
Moreover, even if analysts’ role is the mere dissemination of information, the model in Easley and O’Hara (2004) still 
predicts a beneficial decrease in information asymmetry from increased analyst following. 
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impact. We therefore provide comprehensive and compelling evidence about the channels through 
which accounting expertise impacts analyst forecast properties 
Finally, our study is the first to provide evidence about the relation between accounting 
expertise and market liquidity. Evidence about the relation between accounting expertise and both 
analyst following and liquidity is related to a fundamental issue in accounting research - cost of 
capital - that has been investigated in other settings. See, for example, Previts et al. (1994); Chung 
and Jo (1996); Lang and Lundholm (1996); Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999); Botosan and Harris 
(2000); Barth, Kasznik and McNichols (2001); and Tucker (2010). Our paper therefore 
complements important streams of accounting literature that have assessed determinants of analyst 
following and market liquidity, both of which are related to cost of capital.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and data. Section 4 contains the main 
empirical results. We investigate channels though which accounting expertise improves analyst 
following in Section 5. We provide supporting analyses of analyst forecast properties in Section 
6. Section 7 provides capital market evidence on the impact of accounting expertise. We 
summarize and conclude the study in Section 8. 
2. Institutional Background, Related Literature, and Hypotheses 
2.1 Institutional Background 
The primary role of the audit committee is to oversee the financial reporting process and ensure 
high-quality financial reporting. The SEC has long recommended that companies utilize audit 
committees (SEC 1940). Regulators now focus more on the composition of the audit committee. 
In 1999, in response to concerns that audit committees were not effective in their monitoring role, 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
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(NASD) collaborated to form the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) on improving the effectiveness 
of corporate audit committees. The BRC recommended that audit committee composition include 
at least three “financial literates”, at least one of whom is a “financial expert” (BRC 1999). The 
financial analysts’ professional association, AIMR,3 supported the BRC recommendations for the 
composition of the audit committee, suggesting that analysts consider audit committee 
composition important (AIMR 1999). The U.S. stock exchanges quickly adopted the BRC’s 
recommendations with SEC approval in late 1999.  
Section 407 of SOX underscores the importance of audit committee financial expertise by 
requiring registrants to disclose the name of at least one member on the audit committee who is a 
financial expert or disclose the reason for not having such an expert. SOX recommended a narrow 
definition that required a direct accounting background, but left the final definition to the SEC. 
The SEC’s initial definition of audit committee financial expertise was also narrow, and highly 
controversial. Among others, AIMR indicated its support for the narrow definition of financial 
expertise (AIMR 2002).4 In its final rule, the SEC allowed firms to use a broad definition of 
financial expertise that includes direct accounting work experience, but also includes financial 
reporting supervisory experience (e.g., CEOs) or experience analyzing or evaluating financial 
statements (e.g., investment bankers).  
2.2 Related Literature  
Researchers have devoted considerable effort to studying the relevance of the broad and narrow 
definition of financial expertise. Using the broad definition, prior research finds that firms with 
                                                            
 
3 In 2004, AIMR changed its name to CFA Institute. 
4 However, AIMR did recommend that those with the professional designation of CFA should also be considered a 
financial expert (AIMR 2002). 
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audit committee financial expertise, compared to those without it, are less likely to restate earnings 
(Agrawal and Chadha 2005; Abbott et al. 2004), less likely to dismiss their auditor following a 
going concern report (Carcello and Neal 2003), less likely to engage in earnings management 
(Bedard et al. 2004), more likely to update a voluntary earnings forecast (Karamanou and Vafeas 
2005), and more quickly dismiss the audit firm of Arthur Andersen following the Enron scandal 
(Chen and Zhou 2007). 
Other research examines the consequences of the narrow definition of financial expertise. 
Using a pre-SOX setting, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) find that only audit committee 
accounting expertise is related to more conservative accruals. Also using a pre-SOX setting, 
DeFond et al. (2005) find positive three-day abnormal returns around the appointment of 
accounting, but not non-accounting, experts to the audit committee. Our study differs from DeFond 
et al. (2005) in that we assess analyst response to audit committee appointments pre- and post-
SOX. Engel (2005) indicates that because of the significant regulatory shift post-SOX, it is not 
clear that results in DeFond et al. (2005) would hold in a post-SOX setting.  
In the post-SOX period, Carcello et al. (2008) find that both accounting and non-accounting 
expertise are related to lower abnormal accruals. However, using a larger sample, Dhaliwal et al. 
(2010) report that audit committee accounting expertise is most strongly related to higher accrual 
quality when the accounting experts are independent, hold fewer other directorships, have shorter 
tenure, and when the audit committee also includes a member with a finance background. Dhaliwal 
et al. (2010) find no evidence of a similar relation between accrual quality and audit committee 
members with supervisory expertise.  
Two prior studies also examine the association between board characteristics and analyst 
forecast properties, but not analyst following. In a paper somewhat related to ours, Byard et al. 
 9 
 
(2006) assess the relation between analyst forecast accuracy and four governance variables: (i) 
board independence, (ii) audit committee independence, (iii) CEO duality, and (iv) board size. 
Byard et al. (2006) show that analyst forecast accuracy is positively associated with board 
independence and board size and negatively associated with CEO duality; they find no association 
between analyst forecast accuracy and audit committee independence, however. Abernathy et al. 
(2013) show that accounting expertise on the audit committee is related to higher analyst forecast 
accuracy and lower analyst forecast dispersion. We extend these studies by examining the relation 
between accounting expertise on the audit committee and analyst following.  
While analyst following and forecast accuracy are sometimes positively related, this is not 
always the case. Lehavey et al. (2011) show that firms with more complex disclosures have greater 
analyst following even though analyst forecast errors and dispersion both increase. As Lang et al. 
(2003) argue, although analyst forecast accuracy could improve because more analysts follow a 
firm, analyst forecast accuracy could also operate independently from increased analyst following 
because of information gathering by other capital market intermediaries (e.g., buy-side analysts) 
and/or because firms disclose more information. Related to this latter point, Abernathy et al. (2013) 
report that higher quality accruals associated with accounting expertise help drive the relation 
between accounting expertise and forecast properties. It is therefore an open empirical question as 
to whether audit committee accounting expertise impacts analyst following.  
2.3 Hypotheses Development 
Theoretical and empirical studies, in addition to standards of professional practice, provide 
support for a plausible link between audit committee accounting expertise and analyst following. 
Bushman et al. (2004) suggest a theoretical link between corporate governance mechanisms, such 
as audit committee composition, and analysts. Analysts acquire private information by interacting 
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with management and the board, by touring plant facilities, and by analyzing industry conditions 
and trends, etc. Analysts then aggregate public and private information for dissemination to 
investors (Bushman et al. 2004). Thus, analysts and corporate governance mechanisms are 
“interrelated information mechanisms” (Bushman et al. 2004, p. 210) that contribute to firms’ 
transparency.  
Empirically, Yu (2009) shows that analyst following increases with Standard & Poor’s 
transparency and disclosure rankings of board structure disclosures, suggesting analysts utilize 
information from these disclosures. Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Healy et al. (1999) show that 
analyst following is increasing in the quality of firm disclosures, including those in proxy 
statements where audit committee expertise is disclosed. Finally, Dickins et al. (2009) report 
survey evidence that analysts have more confidence in financial reporting from firms with audit 
committee accounting expertise.  
Professional practice also suggests that analysts evaluate the audit committee. The Certified 
Financial Analyst (CFA) exam covers corporate governance best practices, including expertise of 
the board and its committees (Robinson and Weise 2010).5 A 1999 survey of financial analysts 
indicated that analysts believed that boards of directors were doing a poor job (Epstein and Palepu 
1999), suggesting that analysts evaluated board level corporate governance prior to SOX. As noted 
above, analysts’ professional association supported the BRC recommendations in 1999, implying 
that analysts are specifically concerned with the quality of the audit committee.  
                                                            
 
5 Though Robinson and Weise (2010) indicate that the weight on corporate governance topics increased over the 
period 2000 – 2010, some coverage of board expertise was included for the entire period. 
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We hypothesize a positive relation between audit committee accounting expertise and analyst 
following. Analysts’ decisions to follow a firm depend on the costs and benefits of doing so (Barth 
et al. 2001). We argue that audit committee accounting expertise lowers the costs of following a 
firm because analysts are able to rely more on public information and less on costly private 
information acquisition activities. This is because audit committee accounting expertise improves 
the quality of financial reporting (Carcello et al. 2008; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008; and 
Dhaliwal et al. 2010) and higher quality corporate reporting is associated with greater analyst 
following (Bhushan 1989; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Healy et al. 1999; Arya and Mittendorf 2007; 
Yu 2009). In addition, analysts facilitate monitoring of managers, reducing insiders’ information 
advantages and constraining management’s asset-wasting behavior (Ellul and Panayides 2011; 
Jung et al. 2012). If so, then accounting expertise may support analysts’ monitoring efforts, again 
reducing the cost of following the firm.  
However, a competing theoretical argument suggests enhanced information from corporate 
reporting could reduce analysts’ competitive advantage, thus decreasing incentives for private 
information acquisition (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Lehavy et al. 2011). If so, the decreased 
incentives suggest a negative relation between accounting expertise and analyst following. Despite 
this competing argument, we expect that the arguments supporting a positive relation between 
accounting expertise and analyst following will outweigh the arguments supporting a negative 
relation due to the deeper prior literature that finds a positive relation between enhanced corporate 
reporting and analyst following, and due to the positive views of analysts toward accounting 
expertise expressed in practice (e.g., AIMR 1999). Thus, our first hypothesis states: 





 To the extent that audit committee accounting expertise is associated with an improvement 
in firms’ information environment, we also expect greater market liquidity for these firms. We 
base our prediction on Healy et al. (1999), who show a positive relation between firm disclosure 
and market liquidity. The intuition for our second hypothesis is that audit committee accounting 
expertise increases firms’ information environment, leading to increased investor interest in 
firms’ stocks. Thus, our second hypothesis states: 
H2: There is a positive relation between audit committee accounting expertise and market 
liquidity. 
 
Support for H2 would be consistent with analysts’ incentives to increase coverage of firms with 
audit committee accounting expertise because market liquidity creates additional analyst interest 
in firms (Healy et al. 1999). 
3. Sample and Univariate Results 
3.1 Sample 
We hand-collect data for audit committee expertise from firms’ annual proxy statements.6  
Because hand-collecting this data is non-trivial, we randomly select 500 firms across the S&P 
1500 from the intersection of  I/B/E/S, Compustat, IRRC, First Call, and CRSP data sets over the 
years 1998-2003. This time period is important because many firms were likely changing their 
audit committee accounting expertise in response to SOX. For each firm, we obtain the name and 
business experience of each audit committee member from the background information provided 
on board members in the firm’s proxy statements.  
                                                            
 
6 We hand-collect data because databases with searchable director biographies are sparsely populated pre-SOX. 
 13 
 
We follow prior literature and partition our sample based on both accounting and other types 
of expertise (e.g., Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008; DeFond et al. 2005). In our primary analyses, 
we test accounting expertise. In sensitivity tests, we use other measures of financial expertise. 
Thus, we code categories of expertise as follows:  
 Accounting Expertise: Individuals with current or previous experience as VP of 
Finance, CFO, Controller, or other principal financial or accounting officer of a 
publicly traded company, or as a CPA in public practice, consistent with the SEC’s 
initial proposed definition of a financial expert (SEC 2003). 
 Supervisory Expertise: Individuals with current or previous experience as a CEO or 
President of a publicly traded company, consistent with the SEC’s final definition of 
financial expertise. 
 Finance Expertise: Individuals with current or previous experience in investment 
banking, working at the SEC, loan/credit rating experience, or financial analyst 
experience, also consistent with final SEC rules (SEC 2003).   
 Other: Individuals with experience that does not fall into any of the above categories.   
Some individuals appointed to an audit committee have experience in multiple categories. To 
ensure that each individual is counted in only one category, we use the following ranking when 
coding: (i) accounting expertise, (ii) finance expertise, (iii) supervisory expertise, and (iv) other. 
This ranking process means, for example, that while some members with accounting expertise also 
have finance expertise, the finance expertise category does not include members with accounting 
expertise, and so on.  
We obtain analyst data from the detail file in I/B/E/S, and data for control variables from 
Compustat, CRSP, and IRRC. After deleting firms with incomplete proxy filings or missing data 
for certain variables, our final sample consists of 2,342 firm-years and 460 unique firms, of which 
267 are firms with accounting expertise (sample firms) and 193 are firms without accounting 
expertise on the audit committee (control firms). We winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% 
levels to mitigate the impact of outliers. This initial sample is used in a number of sensitivity tests. 
For the main tests, we construct a panel of the 131 firms that appointed an accounting expert from 
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1998-2003. In Table 1, we present the classification of industries across the 131 firms used in the 
main analyses, demonstrating that the sample is from a broad spectrum of industries. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
3.2 Univariate Results 
Panel A of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression 
analyses (for the 786 firm-years included in panel A). The mean analyst following is about 6. Panel 
B of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables by pre- and post-appointment of an 
audit committee accounting expert. This panel shows a mean increase of about one analyst between 
the pre- and post-appointment periods, consistent with H1. This panel also shows a significant 
increase in trading volume, consistent with H2. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Panel C of Table 2 reports the Pearson correlations between the variables used in the regression 
analyses. There is a positive and significant correlation between analyst following and the 
appointment of an audit committee accounting expert, providing univariate evidence consistent 
with H1. There is also a positive and significant correlation between trading volume and the 
appointment of an audit committee accounting expert, consistent with H2. While most of the 
variables are correlated at fairly low levels, we nevertheless perform formal tests for collinearity 
in our regression analyses.7  
                                                            
 
7 The largest VIF for any variable is 3.7, indicating that collinearity does not appear to affect the regression results.  
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4. Empirical Design and Multivariate Regression Results 
4.1 Empirical Design 
Our first dependent variable of interest is analyst following. We use panel data for the sample 
of firms that appoint accounting experts to the audit committee in order to examine the impact of 
these appointments on changes in analyst following. An important issue with this approach is the 
time over which to expect the change in analyst behavior. In other words, is there an immediate 
effect, or does it take time for the new audit committee member to have an impact? It is reasonable 
to assume that a new audit committee member requires time to understand the intricacies of his/her 
firm’s business and thus be in a position to influence a firm’s disclosures. In the spirit of Lang et 
al. (2003), we therefore examine whether analyst following changes from three years prior to the 
appointment of an accounting expert on the audit committee to three years afterward. We use a 
time-series specification to avoid self-selection bias. To execute our test, we use the following 
model: 
#Analysts = α + β1 Post_Appt + β2 GOV + β3 Broker + β4 Effort + β5 Size + β6 Growth  
  + β7 ROA+ β8 Volume + β9 Issue + β10 Ret_Var + β11 RD_ADV   
  + λ YearDum + κ FirmDum + ε,      (1) 
 
where #Analysts is the number of analysts (adjusted for the median of analyst following in the 
firm’s industry)8 with annual earnings forecasts in the month closest to, but within a preceding 
three-month window of, the annual earnings announcement (Barth et al. 2001).9 Our variable of 
                                                            
 
8 We industry-adjust analyst following to control for the increasing trend in analyst following. Untabulated statistics 
indicate that mean analyst following increased from 3.3 to 4.3 for the entire sample of IBES firms over our sample 
period. 
9 For sensitivity, we also use each firm as its own control and obtain similar results to those reported (untabulated). 
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interest, Post_Appt, is equal to one for the three years following the accounting expert appointment 
and zero for the three years prior to the appointment.  
To control for the effect of other governance mechanisms, we use the composite variable, 
GOV. Following DeFond et al. (2005), we aggregate board size, board independence, audit 
committee size, audit committee independence, G-Index (Gompers et al. 2003), and institutional 
ownership.10 Each component equals one if it exceeds the sample median and zero otherwise. We 
sum the components and create a dichotomous variable, GOV, equal to one if the sum exceeds the 
median of the summed values of all observations.  
Because of the mechanical relation between the size of the brokerage firm that covers a firm 
and the number of analysts that cover a firm, we include the variable, Broker, the average number 
of analysts in the brokerage houses that cover a firm (Barth et al. 2001). Barth et al. (2001) also 
report that firms requiring more analyst effort have lower analyst following, so we include the 
negative of the average number of firms covered by the firm’s analysts (Effort). 
We include controls for firm size (Size), measured as the log of market capitalization at the end 
of the fiscal year, and growth (Growth), measured as the average sales growth over the five prior 
years (Bhushan 1989; O’Brien and Bhushan 1990; Lang and Lundholm 1996). Following Ali et 
al. (2007), we include a control for firm profitability, ROA, measured as net income divided by 
total assets. 
Following Barth et al. (2001), we control for analysts’ incentives to follow a firm and include 
the variables Volume and Issue. Volume is a firm’s trading volume and reflects potential trading 
commissions to brokerage houses. Because analysts are compensated for trade in stocks that they 
                                                            
 
10 Please refer to DeFond et al. (2005, pp. 169-170) for details on each of these components. 
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cover (Irvine 2000), analyst following is likely to increase with trading volume. Also, firms that 
issue public securities generate investment banking fees that brokerage houses value. We measure 
Issue as the dollar magnitude of issuances of either public debt or equity in the current or prior 
year. We include a control for return variance, Ret_Var, because firms with higher return variance 
are likely to have higher expected trading profits, leading to increased analyst following (Bhushan 
1989). We measure Ret_Var using daily stock return variance estimated over the 200 days prior to 
the end of the fiscal year. 
Firms with more intangible assets are likely to have less informative financial statements, thus 
providing incentives to analysts with superior skills to generate trading profits for their clients 
(Barth et al. 2001). We use the variable RD_ADV, the sum of research and development expenses 
and advertising expenses divided by sales, to control for this effect. Finally, we control for year 
(YearDum) and firm (FirmDum) fixed effects. 
4.2 Main Regression Results 
We use a Poisson model to estimate equation (1) and report results after adjusting for firm 
clusters.11 Consistent with H1, results in Table 3 show a positive and significant coefficient of 
0.3706 (p < 0.01) on Post_Appt, implying that analyst following increases following the 
appointment of an accounting expert to the audit committee.12 This result is consistent with the 
univariate results in panel B of Table 2. We next assess the economic significance of this result. 
Because a Poisson regression coefficient represents the change in response (natural logged 
response) corresponding to a one unit change in the corresponding predictor, we need to 
                                                            
 
11 Inferences are unchanged using an OLS regression with the natural log of the number of analysts (untabulated) as 
the dependent variable. 




exponentiate results to obtain the percentage change in analyst following. Doing so yields a value 
of 1.45 (i.e., exp (0. 3706) = 1.45). This result implies that firms appointing an accounting expert 
to their audit committees experience a 45% increase in analyst coverage. Given that median analyst 
coverage is 4.5, the addition of an audit committee accounting expert results in about two 
additional analysts for a typical firm. Thus, our results are economically significant. Results for 
the coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with prior research. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.3 Robustness Tests 
 We next perform a battery of untabulated robustness tests, the results of which do not affect 
inferences from our main results reported in Table 3. 
 As we argue above, it likely takes some time for a new audit committee member to become 
knowledgeable enough about a firm’s operations to influence the firm’s financial reporting. 
We nevertheless estimate our main regression model over the alternative periods of one 
year before and after and two years before and after the appointment of an accounting 
expert. As we conjectured, the magnitude of the coefficient on our variable of interest 
increases in size as the analysis period lengthens. The coefficient on our variable of interest 
is 0.0905 (p=0.07) for years -1 to +1and 0.1808 (p=0.00) for years -2 to +2. Recall that the 
coefficient on our variable of interest in Table 3 is 0.3706 (p=0.00). 
 Though our changes analysis reported in Table 3 incorporates controls for other variables 
expected to impact analyst following, a limitation of this approach is that other events 
potentially confound our results. As another check on the robustness of the results, we use 
the full sample of 460 (2342) firms (firm-years) and estimate the results using a pooled 
cross-sectional regression. We find results consistent with those reported. 
 Given that the SOX definition of audit committee financial expertise encompasses more 
than accounting expertise, we also assess the effects of non-accounting financial expertise 
(i.e., supervisory and finance) on analyst following. We include in Model (1) firms that 
appoint non-accounting financial experts during our sample period and find that non-
accounting expertise is not significant, while the coefficient on the accounting expertise 
variable remains significant and consistent with the main results in Table 3. 
 Dhaliwal et al. (2010) find that the combination of accounting expertise and finance 
expertise on the audit committee is associated with improved accrual quality. In an 
additional test, we find that accounting expertise, alone or in combination with finance 
and/or supervisory expertise, is positively related to analyst following, while neither 
finance nor supervisory expertise alone is significant. 
 Reg FD was passed on October 23, 2000 and could impact analyst following because of 
restrictions on private communications between firms and analysts. We re-estimate model 
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(1) and include an interaction of Post_Appt and a dummy variable equal to one for the post 
Reg-FD period (i.e., 2000-2003). Results indicate that the coefficient on the interaction is 
not significant, implying that Reg FD does not affect results. 
 We re-estimate Model (1) using an alternative measure of governance strength. We follow 
Carcello et al. (2008) and estimate the alternative measure using the following variables: 
Board size=1 if the firm’s board size is between six and nine members, else 0; Board 
expertise=1 if the percentage of independent directors who hold seats on other firms’ 
boards is greater than the sample median, else 0; Relative audit committee power =1 if the 
proportion of the firm’s audit committee size to its board size is greater than the sample 
median, else 0; Audit committee independence=1 if the audit committee is 100 percent 
independent, else 0; Audit committee meetings=1 if the number of audit committee 
meetings is greater than or equal to five, else 0; Institutional ownership=1 if the firm’s 
percentage of institutional ownership is greater than the sample median, else 0. As we did 
earlier, we sum the governance variables and create a dichotomous variable for governance 
strength equal to one if the sum exceeds the median of the summed values of all 
observations. Using this alternative governance measure, we obtain results similar to those 
reported. 
 It is reasonable to assume that SOX increased pressure to add accounting expertise, which 
could also change analysts’ view of the audit committee. Thus, it is possible that the 
relation between audit committee accounting expertise and analyst following differs 
between the pre- and post-SOX regimes. To test our conjecture, we re-estimate equation 
(1) after adding an interaction between Post_Appt and a dummy variable equal to one for 
the years after SOX (i.e., 2002-2003).  We find that neither the coefficient on SOX nor the 
interaction term with SOX is significant.  
 
5.  Potential Channels through which Accounting Expertise Impacts Analyst Following 
We next provide an exploratory analysis of channels through which accounting expertise might 
impact analyst following. Guided by prior research, we conjecture that accounting experts could 
influence analyst following through their influence on audit quality proxied by Big 4 auditors 
(Big4), management earnings forecasts (MEF), and/or accrual quality (AQ). The positive relation 
between accounting expertise and analyst following that we find could be attributed to the effect 
of the audit committee on these three channels.  
We investigate audit quality because Behn et al. (2008) show that Big 4 auditors improve the 
properties of analysts’ forecasts. Accounting experts could impact analyst following either by 
influencing the appointment of Big 4 auditors or by facilitating the effectiveness of existing Big 4 
auditors. We measure Big4 as an indicator variable equal to one for firms that use a Big4 auditor. 
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We investigate management earnings forecasts (MEF) because prior studies find that MEFs are an 
important channel through which managers can provide firm-specific information to investors 
(e.g., Coller and Yohn 1997; Lennox and Park 2006). Again, accounting experts could impact 
analyst following by influencing management disclosure of forward-looking information. We 
obtain MEFs from the First Call Historical Database’s Company Issued Guidance file and use the 
number of annual MEFs issued during the fiscal year.  
Finally, we investigate accrual quality because prior research finds a positive relation between 
accounting expertise on the audit committee and earnings quality. Additionally, Yu (2008) finds 
that analyst following and abnormal accruals are negatively related. We argue that accounting 
experts can use their skill to improve accrual quality and thus positively influence analyst 
following. We test the accrual quality channel using the absolute value of abnormal accruals (AQ) 
multiplied by -1. Thus, higher values of AQ imply higher accrual quality. We follow Kothari et al. 
(2005) and compute unsigned abnormal accruals using a modified version of the Jones (1991) 
model with performance-matching based on return on assets. 
We execute our channel analysis by employing the same basic regression model from Table 3. 
We separately add to the baseline regression proxies for each of the three channels and also 
combine all three channels in one regression. We utilize interaction terms between each channel 
and our indicator variable for the appointment of an accounting expert. These interaction terms 
allow us to directly assess the impact of each channel on analyst following. We tabulate results of 
our channel analysis in Table 4 using five models. Model (1) is the baseline regression and 
provides key results reported in Table 3. Model (2) shows results for Big4, Model (3) shows results 




Results in Table 4 show no impact of a Big 4 auditor (Model 2) or MEF (Model 3) on analyst 
following either before or after the appointment of an accounting expert. In contrast to results for 
Big4 and MEF, we report in Models (4) and (5) that accrual quality has a positive and significant 
impact on analyst following after the appointment of an accounting expert.13 These results are 
consistent with analysts recognizing that accounting experts enhanced their firms’ financial 
reporting through higher accrual quality.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
6. Information Quality of Analysts’ Forecasts 
Similar to Abernathy et al. (2013), we also examine the relation between the appointment of 
an accounting expert and analyst forecast properties. A finding that analysts’ information quality 
is higher in the presence of audit committee accounting expertise would support the beneficial 
effects of audit committee accounting expertise on the information environment. Following prior 
research, we assess the relation between audit committee accounting expertise and (i) forecast error 
and (ii) forecast dispersion as proxies of analysts’ information quality.  
We execute our tests of analyst forecast properties using Model (1), except that we substitute 
analyst forecast error and analyst forecast dispersion for analyst following and include analyst 
following as a control variable. We measure analyst forecast error as the absolute value of the 
median14 forecast of annual earnings per share (EPS) less actual EPS scaled by stock price. We 
measure forecast error at the same time as analyst following. We measure forecast dispersion as 
the standard deviation of analysts’ annual earnings forecast scaled by stock price (again, measured 
                                                            
 
13 The tenor of these results is similar over alternative analysis periods of -1 to +1 and -2 to +2 years relative to the 
appointment of an accounting expert to the audit committee (untabulated). 
14 Inferences are unchanged using the mean forecast (untabulated). 
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at the same time as analyst following). Because we require at least three analysts to calculate 
dispersion, fewer observations are available for dispersion than for analyst following and forecast 
accuracy. 
In Table 5, we report results for tests of analyst forecast properties. We report a negative and 
significant coefficient of -0.0006 (-0.0006) on Post_Appt for forecast error (forecast dispersion).15 
These findings are consistent with those in Abernathy et al. (2013) and the argument that audit 
committee accounting expertise improves information quality and reduces the need for analysts to 
obtain costly private information.16 The coefficients on Effort, Size, ROA, and Volume are 
significant and generally consistent with prior research.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
6.1 Analysis of Channels through which Accounting Expertise impacts Forecast Properties 
Although results in Table 5 largely confirm those in Abernathy et al. (2013), missing from 
Abernathy et al. (2013) is a direct test of the channel through which accounting expertise enhances 
analyst forecast properties. Abernathy et al. (2013) perform an indirect test by adding to their cross-
sectional regression a variable intended to capture accrual quality. We extend Abernathy et al. 
(2013) by performing a more direct test of the channels through which accounting experts can 
potentially influence analyst forecast properties. Additionally, our tests are more comprehensive 
in that we employ three potential channels, while Abernathy et al. (2013) only employ one channel.  
                                                            
 
15 In untabulated tests, we also find that the tenor of results is similar over alternative analysis periods of -1 to +1 
and -2 to +2, similar to results for analyst following. 
16 Abernathy et al. (2013) measures forecast accuracy as negative forecast error and thus show a positive coefficient 
on increased audit committee expertise. 
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We follow the method used in Table 4 to assess the channels through which accounting 
expertise impacts analyst forecast properties. We present the related results in Table 6. Results for 
forecast error are reported in panel A. Model (1) presents baseline results from Table 5. Model (2) 
indicates that while Big 4 firms reduce forecast errors, there is no difference in the effect of a Big 
4 firm on forecast error before or after the appointment of an accounting expert. Model (3) shows 
no impact of management earnings forecasts on forecast errors in either the pre- or post-
appointment periods. Models (4) and (5) show that accrual quality significantly reduces forecast 
error following the appointment of an accounting expert, consistent with results reported in Table 
4. In panel B, we report results for forecast dispersion that are similar to those for forecast error, 
except that accrual quality has no impact on forecast dispersion in the period prior to the 
appointment of an accounting expert to the audit committee.  
Note that Abernathy et al. (2013) report very small changes in the magnitude of the coefficient 
on their variable for accounting expertise when they add accrual quality to their regression. By 
contrast, the coefficients on our interaction term of accounting expertise and accrual quality show 
large and significant improvements in analyst forecast properties due to accounting expertise. 
Overall, results in Table 6 are consistent with those in Table 4 and demonstrate a direct link 
between accounting expertise and analyst forecast properties through enhanced accrual quality.17   
[Insert Table 6 here] 
6.2 Simultaneous Equation Analyses of Analyst Following and Analyst Forecast Properties  
We recognize that analyst following and analyst forecast characteristics are interrelated, 
though not in a mutually exclusive or redundant way (Lang et al. 2003). Alford and Berger (1999) 
                                                            
 
17 The tenor of results in Table 6 holds for alternative analysis periods of -1 to +1 and -2 to +2 (untabulated). 
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indicate that analyst following and forecast accuracy are simultaneously determined. We 
consequently estimate a system of equations similar to that in Alford and Berger (1999). In the 
first model, we regress analyst following on forecast accuracy, the accounting expertise indicator 
variable, and the same set of control variables from Model (1), except that we drop Volume. In the 
second model, we regress forecast accuracy on analyst following, accounting expertise, and the 
same set of controls from Model (1), except that we drop RD_ADV. For completeness, we also 
estimate a similar system of equations to control for the simultaneity of analyst following and 
forecast dispersion. Untabulated results indicate that inferences for accounting expertise are 
consistent with those reported in Table 3. These results suggest that simultaneity is not an issue in 
our setting. 
7. Capital Market Consequences of Audit Committee Accounting Expertise 
While our prior analyses attempt to control for known factors related to analysts’ decisions and 
also control for firm fixed effects, results in Brown et al. (2015) suggest that analysts’ incentives 
to follow firms are not clear. In H2, we seek to provide more direct evidence of a capital market 
effect from audit committee accounting expertise by assessing the relation between audit 
committee accounting expertise and both trading volume and Liu’s (2006) measure of liquidity 
risk. 
Trading volume is a widely used measure related to analysts’ incentives to cover a firm (Beyer 
and Guttman 2011). We measure trading volume as the log of the number of shares (in millions) 
traded during the fiscal year. In panel A of Table 7, we show a positive and significant coefficient 
on audit committee accounting expertise. Our finding that firms with audit committee accounting 
expertise generate more investor interest is consistent with theory that suggests trading volume 
increases in the precision of public information (Kim and Verrecchia 1994). This result is also 
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consistent with the increase in analyst following, in that higher trading volume generates greater 
potential trading commissions to brokerage houses. However, theory also suggests trading volume 
increases in investor disagreement, as proxied by forecast dispersion (Ajinkya et al. 1991). Thus, 
we also control for forecast dispersion in our trading volume model and find forecast dispersion 
also increases trading volume. Since audit committee accounting expertise reduces forecast 
dispersion, our results suggest that both theoretical effects are evident and that the net effect of 
audit committee accounting expertise on trading volume is positive, consistent with H2. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
As an additional test of the market impact of accounting expertise, we employ the measure of 
liquidity risk from Liu (2006) and include in panel B of Table 7 analyses of the relation between 
liquidity risk and audit committee accounting expertise. Liu (2006) develops a comprehensive 
measure of liquidity risk that captures the multi-dimensional nature of liquidity, including trading 
volume turnover. Liu (2006) finds that his measure of liquidity risk is positively related to asset 
returns. In our setting, we expect that if accounting expertise reduces information asymmetry and 
thus lowers liquidity risk, then the coefficient on accounting expertise should be negative and 
significant.  
Following Liu (2006), we measure liquidity risk as the standardized turnover-adjusted number 
of zero daily trading volumes over the prior twelve months. Consistent with our expectation, 
results in panel B of Table 7 show negative and significant coefficients on audit committee 
accounting expertise, implying that the addition of audit committee accounting expertise is related 
to lower liquidity risk, which has been shown to be related to a lower cost of capital (Liu 2006). 
This result is consistent with the trading volume results in panel A of Table 7. Taken together, 
results for trading volume and liquidity risk imply that investors positively value the addition of 
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accounting expertise to the audit committee, which provides analysts with greater incentives to 
follow these firms. Showing that accounting expertise provides economic benefits beyond 
increased analyst following and analyst forecast properties also extends the broader literature on 
the economic benefits associated with audit committee accounting expertise. 
8. Summary and Conclusions 
We examine the relation between audit committee accounting expertise and analyst following. 
We find that analyst following is higher after firms increase audit committee accounting expertise. 
This result is consistent with the notion that audit committee accounting expertise reduces analysts’ 
costs to follow a firm. Our main results are robust to a host of controls known to be related to 
analyst following. In robustness tests, we find that our main inferences are unaffected by 
alternative analysis periods, pooled cross-sectional regressions, other types of audit committee 
financial expertise, the pre- and post-Reg FD periods, an alternative measure of governance 
strength, the pre- and post-SOX periods, and simultaneity. Importantly, we demonstrate that 
accounting experts improve analyst following through the channel of accrual quality. We similarly 
show that accounting experts are associated with lower forecast errors and forecast dispersion, also 
through the channel of accrual quality. Finally, we provide evidence that audit committee 
accounting expertise is related to higher trading volume and lower liquidity risk, suggesting that 
accounting expertise provides capital market benefits, thereby supporting incentives for increased 
analyst following.  
We make several important contributions to the literature. Our study is the first to document 
an empirical link between audit committee expertise and analyst following. This is important 
because analysts affect firms’ information environment, which is a key determinant of resource 
allocation and economic growth (Bushman et al. 2004). Our finding that the impact of audit 
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committee accounting expertise on analyst following flows from the channel of accrual quality 
deepens our understanding of the interrelations between audit committee accounting expertise and 
financial reporting in enhancing the information environment. Our study also provides evidence 
that firms with audit committee accounting expertise enjoy higher trading volume and lower 
liquidity risk, supporting analyst incentives to follow firms and implying that these firms enjoy 
additional capital market benefits beyond increased analyst following and enhanced forecast 
properties. Our findings should therefore be useful to firms seeking to enhance market liquidity 
and analyst following.  
Our findings also contribute to the ongoing debate regarding the efficacy of regulatory and 
legislative efforts that seek to improve the financial expertise of audit committees. Because 
analysts are a proxy for sophisticated investors and influence investors (Schipper 1991), our results 
also support the importance of audit committee accounting expertise according to the SEC’s 
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Table 1  
Industry Classification of Sample Firms 
 
Industry  2-Digit SIC Code n  % Total 
Oil and Gas  13 4  3.05 
Food Products  20 5  3.82 
Paper and Paper Products  24-27 8  6.11 
Chemical Products  28 18  13.74 
Manufacturing  30-34 7  5.34 
Computer Equipment and Services 35, 73 14  10.69 
Electronic Equipment  36 9  6.87 
Transportation  37, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45 10  7.63 
Scientific Instruments  38 13  9.92 
Durable Goods  50 4  3.05 
Retail  53-57, 59 7  5.34 
Eating and Drinking Establishments 58 0  0.00 
Entertainment Services  70, 79 1  0.76 
Health  80 2  1.53 
Professional Services  87 0  0.00 
All Others  All Others 29  22.14 





Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables used in Regression Analyses 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (n = 786) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
#Analysts 5.911 6.489 1 4.500 9 
Post_ Appt 0.500 0.500 0 0.500 1 
GOV 0.383 0.486 0 0 1 
Big4 0.985 0.123 1.000 1.000 1.000 
MEF 1.910 2.604 0.000 1.000 4.000 
AQ -0.057 0.058 -0.073 -0.042 -0.019 
Broker 46.239 25.161 22.333 50.746 64.455 
Effort -9.140 5.570 -12.125 -8.850 -5.750 
Size 8.117 1.332 7.163 8.031 9.019 
Growth 0.108 0.217 0.001 0.077 0.177 
ROA 0.052 0.067 0.023 0.051 0.087 
Volume 363.896 660.549 57.133 131.809 351.030 
Issue 92.277 223.411 4.315 17.002 58.051 
Ret_Var 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
RD_Adv 0.038 0.052 0.000 0.016 0.052 
 
Variable Definitions:  
#Analysts is the number of analysts with annual earnings forecasts in the month closest to, but preceding, 
the annual earnings announcement adjusted by subtracting the industry median. Post_Appt is a dummy 
variable equal to one for the three years following the appointment of an accounting expert and zero for the 
three years prior to the appointment of an audit committee accounting expert. GOV is an aggregate 
governance measure that is comprised of the following components: board size, board independence, audit 
committee size, audit committee independence, G-Index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003), and 
institutional ownership. Please refer to DeFond et al. (2005, pp. 169-170) for details of each of these 
components. Each component equals one if it exceeds the sample median and zero otherwise. We sum the 
components and create a dichotomous variable equal to one if the sum exceeds the median of the summed 
values of all observations. Big4 is a dummy variable equal to one for firms with a Big 4 auditor. MEF is 
the number of annual management earnings forecasts in fiscal year t. AQ is total abnormal accruals 
multiplied by -1; we follow Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) and compute unsigned abnormal accruals 
using a modified version of the Jones (1991) model with performance matching based on return on assets. 
Broker is the average number of analysts employed by the brokerage houses of the firm’s analysts. Effort 
is the negative of the average number of firms covered by the firm’s analysts. Size is the natural log of 
market capitalization (in $million). Growth is the firm’s prior five year sales growth. ROA is the mean of 
prior five years’ return on assets (net income divided by total assets). Volume is trading volume (in millions 
of shares). Issue is the dollar amount of the issuance of public debt or equity in the current or prior year. 
Ret_Var is daily stock return variance estimated over the 200 days prior to the end of the fiscal year. 





Panel B: Means of regression variables in the pre- and post-periods around the appointment of 
an accounting expert to the audit committee (n = 786) 
 





#Analysts 5.365 6.457 1.092 0.01 
GOV 0.349 0.417 0.069 0.05 
Big4 0.985 0.985 0.000 1.00 
MEF 1.209 2.611 1.402 0.00 
AQ -0.059 -0.056 -0.002 0.57 
Broker 44.303 48.175 3.872 0.03 
Effort -9.119 -9.162 -0.043 0.91 
Size 7.977 8.257 0.280 0.00 
Growth 0.115 0.101 -0.014 0.36 
ROA 0.057 0.047 -0.010 0.03 
Volume 276.419 451.374 174.955 0.00 
Issue 74.329 110.225 35.896 0.02 
Ret_Var 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.00 






Panel C: Pearson Correlations (n=786, p-values are in parentheses) 
   Post_ Appt GOV Big4 MEF AQ Broker Effort Size Growth ROA Volume Issue Ret_Var RD_Adv 
#Analysts 0.071 -0.046 0.005 -0.062 0.245 -0.026 0.051 0.522 0.119 0.004 0.514 0.245 0.253 0.328 (0.04) (0.19) (0.90) (0.08) (<.0001) (0.47) (0.15) (<.0001) (0.00) (0.90) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Post_Appt  0.071 0.000 0.269 0.020 0.077 -0.004 0.105 -0.032 -0.077 0.133 0.080 -0.212 -0.050  (0.05) (1.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.03) (0.91) (0.00) (0.36) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.16) 
GOV    0.055 -0.046 -0.022 0.100 -0.005 -0.130 0.030 0.012 -0.013 -0.076 0.123 0.021    (0.12) (0.20) (0.54) (0.00) (0.89) (0.00) (0.39) (0.74) (0.71) (0.03) (0.00) (0.55) 
Big4     -0.056 -0.041 -0.063 -0.041 -0.019 0.025 -0.044 0.040 0.034 0.043 0.077     (0.12) (0.25) (0.08) (0.25) (0.59) (0.49) (0.22) (0.26) (0.35) (0.23) (0.03) 
MEF      0.076 0.118 -0.023 0.262 -0.089 -0.015 0.072 0.225 -0.209 -0.060      (0.03) (0.00) (0.52) (0.00) (0.01) (0.67) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) 
AQ       0.115 -0.246 0.116 -0.115 -0.065 0.242 -0.024 -0.224 -0.366       (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.51) (0.00) (0.00) 
Broker        -0.505 0.149 -0.075 -0.147 -0.089 0.082 -0.041 -0.069        (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) <.0001 (0.01) (0.02) (0.25) (0.05) 
Effort         -0.051 -0.004 0.133 0.169 -0.034 0.194 0.263         (0.16) (0.91) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.00) 
Size          0.095 0.179 0.554 0.512 -0.122 0.167          (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Growth           0.190 -0.015 0.039 0.066 -0.011           (0.00) (0.67) (0.28) (0.06) (0.76) 
ROA            -0.077 -0.033 -0.202 0.000            (0.03) (0.36) (0.00) (0.99) 
Volume             0.472 0.275 0.349             (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Issue              0.037 0.031              (0.30) (0.39) 





Relation between Accounting Expertise on the Audit Committee and Analyst Following 
 
  #Analysts 
Independent Variable Coeff. Est. p-value 
Intercept -0.8360 0.00 
Post_ Appt 0.3706 0.00 
GOV 0.0117 0.75 
Broker -0.0003 0.77 
Effort -0.0044 0.41 
Size 0.3555 0.00 
Growth 0.0813 0.25 
ROA -0.7984 0.00 
Volume 0.0001 0.00 
Issue -0.0002 0.03 
Ret_Var 135.6152 0.00 
RD_ADV 2.4107 0.00 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
N 786 
Pseudo R2 0.460 
 
This table provides results for H1, the relation between accounting 
expertise on the audit committee and analyst following (#Analysts). 
We use a Poisson model and estimate the regression with robust 




Analysis of Potential Channels through which Audit Committee Accounting Expertise impacts Analyst Following 
 
 #Analysts #Analysts #Analysts #Analysts #Analysts 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variable Coeff. Est. p-value Coeff. Est. p-value Coeff. Est. p-value Coeff. Est. p-value Coeff. Est. p-value 
Intercept -0.8360 0.00 -0.4520 0.14 -0.8333 0.00 -0.8319 0.00 -0.4402 0.15 
Post_ Appt 0.3706 0.00 0.3838 0.00 0.3775 0.00 0.2529 0.00 0.0412 0.87 
Post_ Appt * Big4   0.2867 0.25     0.3119 0.21 
Big4   -0.3737 0.11     -0.3747 0.11 
Post_ Appt * MEF     -0.0024 0.87   0.0005 0.97 
MEF     0.0053 0.69   0.0033 0.80 
Post_ Appt * AQ           0.3389 0.08 0.3627 0.05 
AQ           0.1652 0.09 0.2836 0.08 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 786 786 786 786 786 
Pseudo R2 0.436 0.452 0.453 0.460 0.463 
 
This table provides an assessment of three potential channels through which accounting expertise impacts analyst following (#Analysts). Model 1 is our baseline 
model that was reported in Table 3. Model 2 tests the audit quality (Big4 indicator variable = 1 for Big 4 firm) channel. Model 3 tests the frequency of management 
earnings forecasts (MEF) channel, Model 4 tests the accrual quality (AQ) channel, and Model 5 is the full model that controls for all three potential channels. 
Results for control variables are omitted for brevity. We use a Poisson model and estimate regressions with robust standard errors by firm clusters. See Table 2 




Impact of Accounting Expertise on Analyst Forecast Error and Forecast Dispersion 
 
  Forecast Error Forecast Dispersion 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Independent Variable  Coeff. Est. p-value Coeff. Est. p-value 
Intercept 0.0068 0.00 0.0078 0.00 
Post_ Appt -0.0006 0.07 -0.0006 0.02 
GOV -0.0003 0.41 -0.0001 0.60 
Broker 0.0000 0.28 0.0000 0.07 
Effort -0.0001 0.05 -0.0001 0.01 
Size -0.0004 0.01 -0.0003 0.02 
Growth 0.0014 0.14 0.0003 0.64 
ROA -0.0162 0.00 -0.0113 0.00 
Issue 0.0000 0.55 0.0000 0.84 
Ret_Var 0.6115 0.14 0.3148 0.11 
RD_ADV 0.0056 0.24 0.0018 0.54 
#Analysts -0.0001 0.09 -0.0001 0.07 
   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 786 768 
Pseudo R2 0.254 0.307 
This table provides an assessment of the impact of accounting expertise on analyst forecast 
errors and dispersion. Forecast Error is the absolute value of the median consensus estimate 
of annual earnings per share (EPS) less actual EPS scaled by stock price at the time of the 
forecast. Forecast Dispersion is the standard deviation of analysts’ annual earnings forecast 
scaled by stock price at the time of the forecast. Forecast Error and Dispersion are measured 
at same time as #Analysts. We adjust Forecast Error and Forecast Dispersion by subtracting 
the firm’s industry medians. All other variables are defined in Table 2. We estimate 








Panel A: Forecast Error 
 
  Forecast Error 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Coeff. Est. p-value Coeff. Est. p-value Coeff. Est. p-value Coeff. Est. p-value Coeff. Est. p-value 
Intercept 0.0078 0.00 0.0115 0.00 0.0078 0.00 0.0074 0.00 0.0092 0.00 
Post_ Appt -0.0006 0.06 -0.0008 0.09 -0.0006 0.08 -0.0004 0.33 -0.0003 0.36 
Post_ Appt * Big4   0.0001 0.73     -0.0001 0.57 
Big4   -0.0018 0.00     -0.0019 0.00 
Post_ Appt * MEF     0.0000 0.99   0.0000 0.95 
MEF     -0.0001 0.56   -0.0001 0.32 
Post_ Appt * AQ       -0.0037 0.07 -0.0037 0.08 
AQ       -0.0039 0.10 -0.0044 0.10 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 786 786 786 786 786 





Table 6 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Forecast Dispersion 
  Forecast Dispersion  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Coeff. Est. p-value Coeff. Est. p-value Coeff. Est. p-value Coeff. Est. p-value Coeff. Est. p-value 
Intercept 0.0095 0.00 0.0163 0.00 0.0094 0.00 0.0097 0.00 0.0109 0.00 
Post_ Appt -0.0006 0.02 -0.0007 0.05 -0.0005 0.06 -0.0005 0.11 0.0001 0.84 
Post_ Appt * Big4   -0.0002 0.74     -0.0003 0.48 
Big4   -0.0014 0.07     -0.0013 0.08 
Post_ Appt * MEF     -0.0001 0.56   0.0000 0.60 
MEF     0.0000 0.99   -0.0001 0.19 
Post_ Appt * AQ       -0.0036 0.08 -0.0039 0.09 
AQ       -0.0017 0.32 -0.0018 0.37 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 768 768 768 768 768 
Pseudo R2 0.336 0.337 0.340 0.338 0.343 
This table provides an assessment of three potential channels through which accounting expertise impacts analyst forecast error (Panel A) and 
analyst forecast dispersion (Panel B). Model 1 is our baseline regression that was reported in Table 5. Model 2 tests the audit quality (Big4 
indicator variable = 1 for Big 4 firm) channel. Model 3 tests the frequency of management earnings forecasts (MEF) channel, Model 4 tests the 
accrual quality (AQ) channel, and Model 5 is the full model that controls for all three potential channels. Results for control variables are omitted 





Capital Market Impact of Accounting Expertise on the Audit Committee 
 
Panel A: Trading Volume 
 
  Log_Vol Log_Vol 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Independent 
Variable  Coeff. Est. p-value Coeff. Est. p-value 
Intercept -1.6633 0.00 -2.3174 0.00 
Post_ Appt 0.0697 0.04 0.0801 0.03 
Log_MV 0.9716 0.00 0.9742 0.00 
BM -0.0032 0.98 -0.0762 0.54 
Log_Price -0.5532 0.00 -0.6395 0.00 
Idio_Risk 51.6947 0.00 49.6669 0.00 
Inst_Holdings  1.0735 0.00 
Forecast Error  -8.0370 0.13 
Forecast Dispersion  20.6300 0.04  
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 786 732 
Adjusted R2 0.899 0.908 
 
Panel B: Liquidity Risk 
 
  Liquidity Risk Liquidity Risk 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Independent 
Variable  Coeff. Est. p-value Coeff. Est. p-values 
Intercept 0.0195 0.62 0.0458 0.31 
Post_ Appt -0.0009 0.04 -0.0008 0.07 
Log_MV -0.0006 0.08 -0.0001 0.09 
BM -0.0054 0.49 -0.0033 0.69 
Log_Price -0.0065 0.03 -0.0024 0.06 
Idio_Risk 0.4879 0.36 0.5874 0.29 
Inst_Holdings  -0.0453 0.07 
Forecast Error  0.4240 0.07 
Forecast Dispersion  0.1827 0.91  
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 786 732 
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.050 
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This table provides the results for tests of H2, the relation between audit committee 
accounting expertise and both trading volume and liquidity risk.  Log_Vol is the 
natural log of the number of shares (in millions) traded during the fiscal year.  
Liquidity Risk is calculated as (Number of zero daily volumes in prior 12 months + 
1/(12-month turnover*11,000)) *252/Number of trading days in prior 12 months, 
where 12-month turnover is the sum of the ratio of the number of shares traded on a 
day to the number of shares outstanding at the end of the day. All other variables are 
defined in Table 2. We estimate regressions with robust standard errors by firm 
clusters. 
